The Art of War Deleuze Guattari Debord and the Israeli Defence Fore

The Fine art of War/ Strategisches Risiko

Daughter Reading on Embankment – Tel Aviv

Eyal Weizman versus Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, "frieze" versus "Welt". Die Kunst der Politik und die Kunst des Krieges: ein funkelnder Polarstern, zwei Denkrichtungen: Tausend Plateuas und amerikanischer Pragmatismus, within the war motorcar und facing reality. Kein Gespräch, just a form of overlapping. Und wo sind wir, frage ich D.

Weizman: The Israeli Defence Forces have been heavily influenced by contemporary philosophy, highlighting the fact that there is considerable overlap among theoretical texts deemed essential past armed forces academies and architectural schools The attack conducted by units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the metropolis of Nablus in April 2002 was described past its commander, Brigadier-General Aviv Kokhavi, equally 'inverse geometry', which he explained every bit 'the reorganization of the urban syntax past ways of a series of micro-tactical deportment'.one During the boxing soldiers moved within the city across hundreds of metres of 'overground tunnels' carved out through a dense and contiguous urban structure. Although several thousand soldiers and Palestinian guerrillas were manoeuvring simultaneously in the metropolis, they were so 'saturated' into the urban material that very few would have been visible from the air. Furthermore, they used none of the metropolis's streets, roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved horizontally through walls and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of move, described past the military as 'infestation', seeks to redefine within as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares. The IDF's strategy of 'walking through walls' involves a formulation of the metropolis as not just the site but as well the very medium of warfare – a flexible, near liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux.

Goldhagen: Nun, da die Waffen überwiegend schweigen, kann ein Blick zurück uns helfen, nach vorn zu schauen. Das für das Verständnis des Krieges im Libanon und die andauernde Veränderung der Geopolitik des Nahostkonflikts durch die Hisbollah entscheidende Ereignis findet sich zu Beginn des gegenwärtigen Konflikts. Es geht dabei nicht um die Entführung zweier israelischer Soldaten am 12. Juli, sondern um das Verhalten der Hisbollah unmittelbar danach. Als Israel die Entführungen und die im Norden Israels einschlagenden Katjuscha-Raketen als dice Kriegshandlungen verstand, die sie darstellten, bewies die Hisbollah, indem sie sich gegen die Freilassung von zwei Soldaten entschied, dass sie eine fortschreitende, groß angelegte Zerstörung des Libanon bevorzugte.
Zum zweiten Mal in der langen Geschichte des Nahostkonflikts gab ein Feind Israels damit praktisch zu verstehen: Es ist uns egal, was ihr tut. Es ist uns egal, ob unsere Kriegsführung euch dazu bringt, unsere Städte anzugreifen, unsere Wirtschaft zu ruinieren, unsere Menschen zu töten. Was am meisten zählt, ist, euch Schaden zuzufügen, eure Moral zu schwächen und euch dazu zu treiben, große Teile unseres Landes zu zerstören und unsere Kinder zu töten und damit eure internationale Verurteilung voranzutreiben. Mit ihrer zweiten Intifada haben die Palästinenser das gleiche gesagt. Dieser Konflikt jedoch ist anders, denn dass die Raketen der Hisbollah täglich auf State of israel niederregnen, stellte einen nicht tolerierbaren militärischen Übergriff ohne Ende dar.

Weizman: Contemporary war machine theorists are now decorated re-conceptualizing the urban domain. At stake are the underlying concepts, assumptions and principles that determine military strategies and tactics. The vast intellectual field that geographer Stephen Graham has called an international 'shadow world' of military urban research institutes and training centres that take been established to rethink military operations in cities could be understood as somewhat like to the international matrix of élite architectural academies. However, according to urban theorist Simon Marvin, the military-architectural 'shadow earth' is currently generating more intense and well-funded urban research programmes than all these university programmes put together, and is certainly aware of the avant-garde urban inquiry conducted in architectural institutions, peculiarly as regards Tertiary Earth and African cities. In that location is a considerable overlap among the theoretical texts considered essential by military academies and architectural schools. Indeed, the reading lists of contemporary war machine institutions include works from effectually 1968 (with a special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Guy Debord), likewise as more than contemporary writings on urbanism, psychology, cybernetics, mail service-colonial and post-Structuralist theory. If, as some writers claim, the space for criticality has withered away in belatedly 20th-century capitalist culture, information technology seems at present to accept found a identify to flourish in the armed forces.

I conducted an interview with Kokhavi, commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, who at 42 is considered ane of the almost promising immature officers of the IDF (and was the commander of the operation for the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip).2 Like many career officers, he had taken time out from the military to earn a university caste; although he originally intended to study architecture, he ended up with a caste in philosophy from the Hebrew University. When he explained to me the principle that guided the boxing in Nablus, what was interesting for me was not so much the description of the activity itself as the way he conceived its articulation. He said: 'this space that you expect at, this room that you await at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. […] The question is how do you translate the aisle? […] We interpreted the aisle as a place forbidden to walk through and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window equally a place forbidden to wait through, because a weapon awaits usa in the alley, and a booby trap awaits u.s.a. behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do non want to obey this estimation and fall into his traps. […] I desire to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I demand to win […] This is why that nosotros opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Similar a worm that eats its style forward, emerging at points then disappearing. […] I said to my troops, "Friends! […] If until now you were used to move along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls!"'ii Kokhavi's intention in the battle was to enter the city in gild to kill members of the Palestinian resistance so become out. The horrific frankness of these objectives, as recounted to me by Shimon Naveh, Kokhavi's teacher, is office of a full general Israeli policy that seeks to disrupt Palestinian resistance on political likewise as military machine levels through targeted assassinations from both air and ground.

If you still believe, as the IDF would similar you lot to, that moving through walls is a relatively gentle form of warfare, the following description of the sequence of events might change your mind. To begin with, soldiers assemble behind the wall and then, using explosives, drills or hammers, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Stun grenades are and so sometimes thrown, or a few random shots fired into what is commonly a individual living-room occupied by unsuspecting civilians. When the soldiers have passed through the wall, the occupants are locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the operation is concluded, often without water, toilet, food or medicine. Civilians in Palestine, equally in Iraq, have experienced the unexpected penetration of state of war into the individual domain of the home as the well-nigh profound grade of trauma and humiliation. A Palestinian woman identified only every bit Aisha, interviewed by a announcer for the Palestine Monitor, described the experience: 'Imagine it – yous're sitting in your living-room, which you know and so well; this is the room where the family watches television together afterward the evening meal, and of a sudden that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with grit and debris, and through the wall pours 1 soldier subsequently the other, screaming orders. You have no idea if they're after you, if they've come to have over your dwelling, or if your firm just lies on their route to somewhere else. The children are screaming, panicking. Is information technology possible to fifty-fifty brainstorm to imagine the horror experienced by a v-year-sometime kid as four, half-dozen, viii, 12 soldiers, their faces painted black, sub-machine-guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look similar behemothic alien bugs, blast their fashion through that wall?'3

Naveh, a retired Brigadier-Full general, directs the Operational Theory Enquiry Found, which trains staff officers from the IDF and other militaries in 'operational theory' – defined in armed forces jargon as somewhere between strategy and tactics. He summed up the mission of his institute, which was founded in 1996: 'We are like the Jesuit Social club. We try to teach and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John Forester, and other architects. We are reading Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz. Non myself, merely our soldiers, our generals are reflecting on these kinds of materials. We have established a school and developed a curriculum that trains "operational architects".'4 In a lecture Naveh showed a diagram resembling a 'square of opposition' that plots a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labelled with phrases such equally 'Deviation and Repetition – The Dialectics of Structuring and Construction', 'Formless Rival Entities', 'Fractal Manoeuvre', 'Velocity vs. Rhythms', 'The Wahabi War Machine', 'Postmodern Anarchists' and 'Nomadic Terrorists', they often reference the piece of work of Deleuze and Guattari. War machines, according to the philosophers, are polymorphous; diffuse organizations characterized past their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of small-scale groups that split or merge with one some other, depending on contingency and circumstances. (Deleuze and Guattari were aware that the land can willingly transform itself into a military. Similarly, in their word of 'shine space' it is implied that this formulation may atomic number 82 to domination.)

Goldhagen: Wie soll Israel – wie würde ein beliebiges Land – mit einem solchen Feind verfahren? Mit Ausnahme des verzweifelten Saddam Hussein während des Golfkriegs von 1991 haben andere Länder und Armeen, die Israel zerstören wollten, es nicht gewagt, israelische Städte zu bombardieren, weil sie wussten, dass Israel Kairo, Amman oder Damaskus umso intensiver bombardiert hätte. State of israel vermochte abzuschrecken. (Seine nukleare Abschreckung bewegte Ägypten zum Friedensschluss.) Und selbst wenn ein Feind einen solchen Angriff gewagt hätte, würde Israel ihn zur Aufgabe genötigt haben, indem es ihm solange Schaden zufügte, bis er abgelassen hätte. Mit der Hisbollah – und in weiten Teilen ebenso mit der Hamas – hat State of israel seine ersten beiden strategischen Optionen im Umgang mit einem aggressiven, gefährlichen Gegner eingebüßt: Abschreckung und Nötigung (dice Zufügung massiver Zerstörung also). Das dritte strategische Mittel im Umgang mit einem Feind, ein aufrichtiger Friedensschluss, war niemals möglich, denn sowohl die Hisbollah als auch die Hamas haben sich aus religiöser und ideologischer Überzeugung, wie sie selbst sagen, Israels kompletter Zerstörung anheimgegeben und verstehen jede Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten als bloßes Zwischenspiel vor dem nächsten Angriff. Sechs Jahre nach dem Abzug Israels aus dem Libanon sah sich die Hisbollah, die ihr terroristisches Raketenarsenal ausgebaut hat, mit dem Angriff am Beginn der Erfüllung ihrer Wünsche. Ihr Führer Hassan Nasrallah erklärte, dieser Angriff sei "der Anfang vom Ende dieses Gebildes".
Daher lid State of israel die vierte strategische Option gewählt: seinen gefährlichen Gegner zu verheeren, was auch die Abschreckung wiederherstellen würde. Jedoch stellte Israel fest, dass es gegen einen terroristischen Gegner, dessen Mitglieder wie Zivilisten aussehen und dessen Raketen, die Israel aus der Ferne bedrohen, überall versteckt sind, länger kämpfen und viel größere Teile des Libanon besetzen und zerstören musste, als moralisch, klug oder auch nur praktikabel erschien. Daher dice wochenlange Verzögerungstaktik. Doch selbst wenn State of israel den südlichen Libanon besetzt hätte, hätte dice Hisbollah ihre Kampfhandlungen fortgesetzt, die Raketenangriffe auf State of israel eingeschlossen, und kein Ende war in Sicht.
Welche strategischen Möglichkeiten blieben? Die fünfte ist unerträglich: mit den anhaltenden, wahrscheinlich zunehmenden Raketenangriffen auf den Norden und möglicherweise auf das Herz des Landes zu leben – Nasrallah hat versprochen, dass es "viele Städte im Zentrum Israels gibt, die in der "Nach-Haifa-Phase' ins Visier genommen" würden – wozu es früher oder, nach einem Zwischenspiel, später kommen kann.
Die sechste Option wäre die Wiederherstellung der Abschreckung durch die Nötigung derer, dice die Hisbollah unterstützen und mit Nachschub versorgen, gewesen: Syrien und Iran. Keines dieser Länder will einen Krieg mit dem überlegenen Israel (Syriens Säbelrasseln zum Trotz). Sollten dice Raketenangriffe der Hisbollah zu israelischen Vergeltungsmaßnahmen gegen Syrien und eventuell gegen den Iran (und seine Atomanlagen) führen, dann würden Syrien und Iran genötigt, die Hisbollah zu stoppen.
Offenkundig wäre diese strategische Selection ein letzter Versuch, wenig reizvoll und mit seinen eigenen Risiken behaftet. Er würde zu einer enormen Eskalation des Konflikts führen und den Druck der internationalen Gemeinschaft auf Israel erhöhen. Allerdings hätte diese Option den Vorteil, dass sie mit der größten Wahrscheinlichkeit das langfristige Überleben Israels und, mag das auch nicht gleich eingängig erscheinen, ebenso den Frieden in der Region sichern würde, indem sie Israels anhaltende Fähigkeit zur Abschreckung bewiese. Auch hätte sie dice andernfalls gewisse massive Zerstörung des Libanon verhindern können.

Weizman: I asked Naveh why Deleuze and Guattari were so popular with the Israeli military. He replied that 'several of the concepts in A Grand Plateaux became instrumental for u.s. […] allowing us to explain gimmicky situations in a way that we could non accept otherwise. It problematized our own paradigms. Most important was the distinction they have pointed out between the concepts of "smooth" and "striated" infinite [which appropriately reflect] the organizational concepts of the "war machine" and the "land apparatus". In the IDF we now oft use the term "to smooth out infinite" when we desire to refer to operation in a space as if it had no borders. […] Palestinian areas could indeed be thought of as "striated" in the sense that they are enclosed by fences, walls, ditches, roads blocks and and then on.'5 When I asked him if moving through walls was function of it, he explained that, 'In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem. […] Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and do.'6

To empathise the IDF's tactics for moving through Palestinian urban spaces, it is necessary to understand how they interpret the by now familiar principle of 'swarming' – a term that has been a buzzword in military theory since the start of the The states post cold War doctrine known as the Revolution in Military Affairs. The swarm manoeuvre was in fact adapted, from the Artificial Intelligence principle of swarm intelligence, which assumes that problem-solving capacities are found in the interaction and communication of relatively unsophisticated agents (ants, birds, bees, soldiers) with little or no centralized command. The swarm exemplifies the principle of non-linearity credible in spatial, organizational and temporal terms. The traditional manoeuvre paradigm, characterized by the simplified geometry of Euclidean club, is transformed, according to the armed services, into a circuitous fractal-similar geometry. The narrative of the battle programme is replaced by what the military, using a Foucaultian term, calls the 'toolbox arroyo', according to which units receive the tools they need to deal with several given situations and scenarios but cannot predict the club in which these events would really occur.7 Naveh: 'Operative and tactical commanders depend on i some other and learn the issues through constructing the battle narrative; […] action becomes noesis, and knowledge becomes activeness. […] Without a decisive event possible, the main do good of performance is the very improvement of the organization as a organization.'viii

This may explain the fascination of the military with the spatial and organizational models and modes of functioning advanced by theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, as far as the military is concerned, urban warfare is the ultimate Postmodern form of conflict. Belief in a logically structured and single-track boxing-plan is lost in the face of the complexity and ambivalence of the urban reality. Civilians get combatants, and combatants become civilians. Identity can be inverse equally quickly every bit gender can be feigned: the transformation of women into fighting men can occur at the speed that it takes an undercover 'Arabized' Israeli soldier or a camouflaged Palestinian fighter to pull a machine-gun out from under a dress. For a Palestinian fighter caught upward in this boxing, Israelis seem 'to be everywhere: behind, on the sides, on the right and on the left. How tin can you fight that style?'nine

Critical theory has go crucial for Nave's teaching and training. He explained: 'nosotros employ critical theory primarily in society to critique the military institution itself – its fixed and heavy conceptual foundations. Theory is important for u.s. in order to articulate the gap betwixt the existing epitome and where we want to go. Without theory we could not make sense of the dissimilar events that happen around united states and that would otherwise seem disconnected. […] At present the Institute has a tremendous affect on the military; [it has] become a destructive node within it. By training several high-ranking officers we filled the system [IDF] with subversive agents […] who ask questions; […] some of the peak brass are not embarrassed to talk about Deleuze or [Bernard] Tschumi.'10 I asked him, 'Why Tschumi?' He replied: 'The idea of disjunction embodied in Tschumi's volume Compages and Disjunction (1994) became relevant for the states […] Tschumi had another arroyo to epistemology; he wanted to break with single-perspective noesis and centralized thinking. He saw the world through a variety of dissimilar social practices, from a constantly shifting betoken of view. [Tschumi] created a new grammar; he formed the ideas that compose our thinking.11 I and so asked him, why not Derrida and Deconstruction? He answered, 'Derrida may be a little too opaque for our crowd. We share more with architects; we combine theory and do. We tin can read, but we know as well how to build and destroy, and sometimes kill.'12

Goldhagen: Welche strategischen Möglichkeiten Israel auch hatte, alle waren sie schlecht oder unwirksam oder nicht wünschenswert. Und nun ist, als vermeintlicher "deus ex machina", eine Uno-Resolution verabschiedet worden, dice eine internationale Truppe südlich des Litani-Flusses vorsieht, mit einem Mandat, die raketenbewehrte Hisbollah zu verdrängen, nicht aber sie zu entwaffnen. Auch wenn sich damit eine neue, siebte strategische Option ergibt, die einen neuen strategischen Mitspieler bringt, der die Region möglicherweise stabilisieren und ein neues Sicherheitsparadigma schaffen könnte, könnte sich die Entwicklung als gefährliche Niederlage Israels erweisen. Denn selbst wenn die internationale Truppe ihre Aufgabe, dice Hisbollah aus diesem südlichsten Teil des Libanon fernzuhalten, ernsthaft angeht, bleibt der Norden Israels in Reichweite der Raketen der Hisbollah (die sich mit der Zeit nur vergrößern wird). Die Hisbollah kann einen Guerillakrieg gegen dice internationale Truppe führen, der es womöglich an den erforderlichen Mitteln fehlt, um sich durchzusetzen. Zudem würde sie der Hisbollah gestatten, fortzubestehen, sich mit der Hilfe Syriens und Irans neu zu bewaffnen und zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt anzugreifen – und dabei in den Augen der arabischen Welt das stolze Symbol des Triumphs zu bleiben, ein Drittel Israels terrorisiert und dice Juden dort zur Flucht gezwungen zu haben.
Human being gebe sich keiner Täuschung hin. Israel chapeau um sein Überleben gekämpft. Unerwartet. Denn es steht vor einem historisch neuen fanatischen Feind, dem politischen Islam, den dreierlei charakterisiert: eine politisch-religiöse Ideologie, die die Vernichtung ihrer Gegner fordert; Gleichgültigkeit, ja sogar Freude angesichts des Todes seiner Anhänger, denn Märtyrer werden mit einem Platz im Himmel belohnt; und eine buchstäblich unaufhaltsame Technologie (Raketen) und Technik (Selbstmordattentate) des Terrors. Das Schreckgespenst endlosen Terrors und endlosen Kriegs sucht Israel heim und droht es zu verkrüppeln.
Den politischen Islamisten hat ihre neu entdeckte Macht Auftrieb gegeben. Nasrallahs Prahlerei hallt in der ganzen arabische Welt wider. Dort, insbesondere in der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde, wird Nasrallah als Held gefeiert, der einen neuen Weg zur Zerstörung Israels gewiesen hat. So erklärte der palästinensische Kulturminister Atallah Abu al-Sabah anlässlich einer Kundgebung für dice Hisbollah: "Die Redensart, Israel sei hier, um zu bleiben, lid sich als falsch erwiesen." "State of israel kann besiegt werden", fuhr er fort, "und das ist es, was die arabischen Regierungen wissen sollten. Es ist an der Zeit, dice arabischen Waffen zu entstauben und sie zu nutzen, um Palästina und die al-Aksa-Moschee zu befreien." Und dice Gefährlichkeit des politischen Islam wird sich noch tausendfach erhöhen, wenn der Iran, Epizentrum des politischen Islam und Herr der Hisbollah, sich mit Nuklearwaffen selbst so unverwundbar macht, dass er Raketenangriffe und andere Attacken gegen seine vielen Angriffsziele wagen kann – angefangen mit Israel, das, wie der iranische Präsident Mahmud Ahmadi-Nedschad wiederholt erklärt lid, vernichtet werden müsse, und über das der einflussreiche ehemalige Präsident Haschemi Rafsandschani 2001 rundheraus gesagt hat: "Die Anwendung einer einzigen Atombombe würde Israel völlig zerstören", während sie der islamischen Welt nur begrenzten Schaden zufügen würde. "Es ist nicht unvernünftig", fügte er hinzu, "eine solche Möglichkeit in Erwägung zu ziehen."

Weizman: In addition to these theoretical positions, Naveh references such canonical elements of urban theory equally the Situationist practices of dérive (a method of drifting through a city based on what the Situationists referred to as 'psycho-geography') and détournement (the adaptation of abandoned buildings for purposes other than those they were designed to perform). These ideas were, of course, conceived past Guy Debord and other members of the Situationist International to challenge the congenital bureaucracy of the backer city and pause downwards distinctions between private and public, within and exterior, use and function, replacing private space with a 'borderless' public surface. References to the work of Georges Bataille, either straight or as cited in the writings of Tschumi, also speak of a desire to attack architecture and to dismantle the rigid rationalism of a postwar order, to escape 'the architectural strait-jacket' and to liberate repressed human desires.
In no uncertain terms, education in the humanities – often believed to be the most powerful weapon against imperialism – is being appropriated every bit a powerful vehicle for imperialism. The military's apply of theory is, of course, cypher new – a long line extends all the mode from Marcus Aurelius to General Patton. Future armed services attacks on urban terrain will increasingly be dedicated to the use of technologies developed for the purpose of 'un-walling the wall', to infringe a term from Gordon Matta-Clark. This is the new soldier/architect's response to the logic of 'smart bombs'. The latter take paradoxically resulted in college numbers of civilian casualties simply because the illusion of precision gives the military-political complex the necessary justification to utilize explosives in civilian environments.

Here another utilise of theory every bit the ultimate 'smart weapon' becomes apparent. The war machine's seductive employ of theoretical and technological soapbox seeks to portray state of war as remote, quick and intellectual, exciting – and even economically viable. Violence tin can thus exist projected as tolerable and the public encouraged to back up it. Every bit such, the evolution and dissemination of new military technologies promote the fiction being projected into the public domain that a military solution is possible – in situations where it is at best very hundred-to-one.

Although you do not need Deleuze to set on Nablus, theory helped the armed services reorganize by providing a new language in which to speak to itself and others. A 'smart weapon' theory has both a applied and a discursive function in redefining urban warfare. The applied or tactical function, the extent to which Deleuzian theory influences military tactics and manoeuvres, raises questions about the relation between theory and do. Theory obviously has the power to stimulate new sensibilities, but it may also aid to explain, develop or even justify ideas that emerged independently inside disparate fields of knowledge and with quite different ethical bases. In discursive terms, war – if information technology is not a total war of annihilation – constitutes a form of discourse between enemies. Every armed forces action is meant to communicate something to the enemy. Talk of 'swarming', 'targeted killings' and 'smart destruction' aid the military communicate to its enemies that it has the chapters to effect far greater devastation. Raids can thus be projected every bit the more moderate alternative to the devastating capacity that the armed services actually possesses and will unleash if the enemy exceeds the 'acceptable' level of violence or breaches some unspoken understanding. In terms of military operational theory information technology is essential never to use one's total destructive capacity only rather to maintain the potential to escalate the level of atrocity. Otherwise threats get meaningless.

Goldhagen: Ein Islamic republic of iran mit Atomwaffen, der den Hass von Hisbollah und Hamas auf Israels bloße Existenz teilt, wäre eine millionenfach reichere, destruktivere Hisbollah, die viele Hisbollahs mehr gründen, finanzieren und mit Nachschub versorgen könnte, um viele Feinde mehr zu bedrohen, darunter die westlichen Länder, die von Ahmadi-Nedschad und den Mullahs mit kaum geringerer Leidenschaft gehasst werden.
Was immer die Kämpfe gebracht haben mögen, die anhaltende Folge dieses Konflikts ist Israels große Verletzlichkeit: mit einfachen und billigen Raketen und Terroristen, die den Märtyrertod suchen, können seine Feinde praktisch das ganze, geografisch winzige Land lähmen. Die Innenstadt von Tel Aviv ist nur zwanzig Kilometer vom Westjordanland entfernt. Israels Feinde aus den Reihen des politischen Islam verstehen dice neue geostrategische Situation und frohlocken. Die Zerstörung Israels, einst ein fernes Ziel, das einen langen Kampf lohnte, scheint ihnen nun in greifbarer Nähe. Die Aussicht wiederum, sie könnten sich auf einen endgültigen Frieden mit State of israel einlassen, verringert sich entsprechend.
Auch dice entfernteren Angriffsziele dieser totalitären Geister – alle "Ungläubigen" insbesondere in den Vereinigten Staaten und Europa – sollten jetzt die neue geostrategische Situation analysieren und ernüchtert erkennen, dass Israel, indem es diesen Verteidigungskrieg führt, um das geostrategische Gleichgewicht wiederherzustellen und sein langfristiges Überleben zu sichern, am Ende auch um ihretwillen gekämpft lid.
Weizman: When the war machine talks theory to itself, it seems to exist nigh changing its organizational structure and hierarchies. When information technology invokes theory in communications with the public – in lectures, broadcasts and publications – it seems to be well-nigh projecting an image of a civilized and sophisticated military. And when the military 'talks' (as every military does) to the enemy, theory could be understood as a particularly intimidating weapon of 'shock and awe', the message existence: 'Y'all will never even understand that which kills you.'

Daniel Jonah Goldhagen ist Mitarbeiter des Zentrums für Europäische Studien an der Universität Harvard und Autor von "Hitlers willige Vollstrecker".

Eyal Weizman is an architect, writer and Manager of Goldsmith's College Eye for Research Architecture. His work deals with issues of conflict territories and human being rights.

i Quoted in Hannan Greenberg, 'The Limited Conflict: This Is How You Trick Terrorists', in Yediot Aharonot; http://www.ynet.co.il (23 March 2004)
two Eyal Weizman interviewed Aviv Kokhavi on 24 September at an Israeli military base near Tel Aviv. Translation from Hebrew past the writer; video documentation by Nadav Harel and Zohar Kaniel
iii Sune Segal, 'What Lies Beneath: Excerpts from an Invasion', Palestine Monitor, November, 2002;
http://www.palestinemonitor.org/eyewitness/Westbank/what_lies_beneath_by_sune_segal.html 9 June, 2005
4 Shimon Naveh, give-and-take following the talk 'Dicta Clausewitz: Fractal Manoeuvre: A Brief History of Futurity Warfare in Urban Environments', delivered in conjunction with 'States of Emergency: The Geography of Human Rights', a debate organized by Eyal Weizman and Anselm Franke as function of 'Territories Alive', B'tzalel Gallery, Tel Aviv,
5 November 2004
5 Eyal Weizman, telephone interview with Shimon Naveh, xiv October 2005
6 Ibid.
7 Michel Foucault'southward description of theory as a 'toolbox' was originally adult in conjunction with Deleuze in a 1972 word; see Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power', in Michel Foucault, Linguistic communication, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and intro. Donald F. Bouchard, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980, p. 206
8 Weizman, interview with Naveh
9 Quoted in Yagil Henkin, 'The Best Style into Baghdad', The New York Times, three April 2003
10 Weizman, interview with Naveh
eleven Naveh is currently working on a Hebrew translation of Bernard Tschumi'due south Architecture and Disjunction, MIT Printing, Cambridge, Mass., 1997.
12 Weizman, interview with Naveh

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Source: https://socialfairydust.wordpress.com/2006/08/22/the-art-of-war-strategisches-risiko/

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